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Abstract
The practices of the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) are an important issue in U.S. - Canada trade
disputes and WTO negotiations.  This study analyzes the CWB’s effect on U.S. producers by
reviewing findings from previous research and developing models to analyze CWB wheat exports
to the United States and the competitive structure of Canadian wheat exports in the world market. 
U.S. grain producers could benefit from the removal of the CWB as the United States could
become more competitive in export markets.  However, elimination of the CWB could also result
in an increase in Canadian wheat exports to the United States as Canadian producers near the
border could sell directly to the United States to take advantage of market opportunities.  The net
effect is difficult to quantify.  The net benefits may be significant in the short run, but reduced
significantly in the long run.  Similarly, if Canada reforms its wheat board by eliminating trade-
distorting subsidies, the United States may increase its exports and Canadian exports to the
United States may increase.  The net benefits from reforming the CWB could be greater than
those from eliminating it.  However, the United States could benefit the most from complete
elimination of state trading enterprises (STEs), since they have elements distorting trade flows
and the United States competes with several STEs in the world wheat market.
Keywords: Canadian Wheat Board, state trading enterprises, price discrimination, wheat exports iii
Highlights
The Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) is a state trading enterprise (STE) that acts as the sole
exporter of western Canadian wheat, durum, and barley.  The practices of the  CWB have become
an issue in U.S. - Canada trade disputes and WTO negotiations.  The recent WTO Doha Round
framework agreement addresses the potential trade-distorting practices of exporting STEs.  The
objective of this study is to analyze the effects in the United States of the CWB’s single-desk
control on exports.  Specific objectives are to examine the findings of previous studies that have
analyzed these issues, analyze CWB wheat exports to the United States, and estimate the pricing
behavior of the CWB in major export markets.
Three pillars provide the basis of CWB operations: single-desk selling, price pooling, and
government guarantees.  As a single-desk seller, western Canadian wheat and barley producers
sell as one.  The CWB claims that a single-desk seller can command a higher return for its grains
than multiple sellers could by competing against each other.  The CWB benefits from government
guarantees.  Canadian producers get an initial payment when they deliver their grain, and the
Canadian government guarantees this payment, covering CWB losses if it fails to capture the
initial prices.  The government also provides guarantees on the CWB’s borrowing.
Most of the studies that have analyzed a change from the CWB’s monopoly export power to
multiple sellers have found that Canadian grain exports to the United States would likely increase
under a multiple-seller environment.  Some argue, however, that the CWB exerts market power in
overseas markets and has unfair advantages detrimental to U.S. exports.  
Studies have examined the ability of the CWB to price discriminate in export markets for both
wheat and barley.  Many of these studies have found that the CWB has the ability to engage in
some degree of price discrimination, but there is disagreement about the evidence of market
power.  Some other issues discussed in previous research include transparency, the initial
payment guarantee, the pre-payment mechanism, and underselling.  The structure of the CWB
may allow it to engage in activities that put U.S. exporters at a disadvantage, but studies have not
been able to show if such trade-distorting activity has harmed U.S. producers.
Elimination of the CWB could result in an increase in Canadian wheat exports to the United
States because individual producers in Canada could export grain to the United States to obtain
higher prices.  Wheat is being exported into the United States only because the net return to
Canadian producers is higher than that obtained from shipping to offshore markets.  Any change
in transportation costs, either offshore or domestic, or a change in the relationship between world
and U.S. domestic wheat price will affect the level of Canadian exports to the United States.  The
CWB is probably providing a leveling effect on the quantity of Canadian exports.  In some years,
the U.S. market may provide better returns than offshore markets, and in other years it may not;
however, until the recent import duty, the level of Canadian exports to the United States had been
relatively constant.
Transportation costs to the United States for Canadian producers near the border are lower than
those for other Canadian producers.  Without the CWB, most Canadian producers along the
border could maximize their profit by shipping their grain to elevators in North Dakota, Montana,
and Minnesota.  As a result, the elimination of the CWB may increase Canadian exports to the
United States. iv
The CWB could also have an effect on U.S. competitiveness in offshore markets where U.S.
exporters compete with the CWB.  Canada is the most important competitor in both the U.S.
domestic market and the world market.  The competitiveness of an exporting country can be
analyzed indirectly by observing pricing-to-market (PTM) behavior.  Exporters may exercise
market power by adjusting prices to different export destinations.  This study uses the PTM
approach to analyze the competitive structure of Canadian and U.S. wheat exports in the world
market. 
The results from the PTM analysis highlight several notable points.  First, the CWB is found to
exercise PTM behavior in some markets.  Second, with respect to the bilateral trade between
Canada and the United States, Canadian wheat exporters exhibit PTM behavior.  Third, findings
of PTM behaviors suggest that the international wheat market is imperfectly competitive.  These
findings are not conclusive, however, because of data limitations for Canadian wheat export
prices in each export destination.  Actual transaction data from the CWB, which are unavailable,
would provide more meaningful results.  
U.S. wheat producers could benefit from increased competitiveness abroad if CWB advantages
and hidden subsidies are removed, but they could also be harmed from increased Canadian wheat
exports to the United States if the CWB is eliminated.  The net effect is difficult to quantify, but
the net benefits for the U.S. industry could be significant in the short run and then reduced
significantly in the long run.  The benefits for U.S. exporters could be short-lived as the Canadian
industry improves its competitiveness and competition between the United States and other
exporting countries increases.  Domestically, it is likely that the U.S. and Canadian markets will
become more integrated without the CWB.  However, because of shipping costs, the market
integration may be limited to those Canadian producers located near the border.  
If the CWB is reformed by eliminating trade-distorting subsidies, the United States may increase
its competitiveness in offshore markets, but Canadian exports to the United States could increase. 
The net benefit from maintaining the CWB’s single-desk authority but eliminating trade-
distorting practices may be greater than the benefit from completely eliminating the CWB. 
Overall, however, the United States could benefit the most from complete elimination of STEs
because U.S. exporters also compete with other countries’ export trading enterprises.
Since exporting STEs have many elements which may distort trade flows, they should be
eliminated under the WTO negotiations.  If this is not possible, STEs should be reformed so that
they are less market distorting.  The reforms should address transparency, government guarantees
of initial payments, and the underwriting of losses.*Won W. Koo is Professor and Director of the Center for Agricultural Policy and Trade Studies (CAPTS) at
North Dakota State University, Fargo.  Jeremy W. Mattson is a Research Assistant in the Center, Hyun J. Jin and
Guedae Cho are Research Assistant Professors, and Richard D. Taylor is a Research Scientist in CAPTS.
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INTRODUCTION
The practices of the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) have become an issue in U.S. - Canada trade
disputes and the recent WTO negotiations.  The CWB is a state trading enterprise (STE) that acts
as the sole exporter of western Canadian wheat, durum, and barley.  With jurisdiction over
Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and part of British Columbia, the CWB markets most of the
Canadian wheat.  In the United States, some producers argue that the CWB has unfair trade
advantages.  The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) has targeted the CWB through
comprehensive and meaningful reform of monopoly STEs in the WTO negotiations.  The recent
WTO Doha Round framework agreement calls for the elimination of trade-distorting practices
with respect to exporting STEs, including export subsidies provided to or by them, government
financing, and the underwriting of losses.  The issue of the future use of single-desk authority is
also subject to further negotiation.  
There is one view that the CWB manipulates prices and unfairly markets Canadian grain,
undercutting U.S. prices to make sales.  Eliminating the single-desk authority of export trading
enterprises could prevent the CWB from engaging in these activities, resulting in a decline in
exports to the United States, a more even playing field in offshore markets, and a rise in U.S.
prices.  Another view, however, suggests that eliminating the CWB’s single-desk status would not
help, and could actually hurt, U.S. producers.  Without the CWB’s control on exports, individual
Canadian producers could sell grain directly into the United States.  Currently, the CWB could
actually be restraining exports to the United States because of political concerns.  Replacing the
single-desk seller with multiple sellers looking to take advantage of U.S. market opportunities
could result in increased Canadian exports to the United States and a decline in U.S. prices. 
The objective of this study is to analyze the effects in the United States of the CWB’s single-desk
powers.  Specific objectives are to examine the findings of previous studies that have analyzed
these issues, analyze Canadian wheat exports to the United States, and estimate the pricing
behavior of the CWB in major export markets.  The next section of this paper provides an
overview of the operations of the CWB.  A number of previous studies have analyzed CWB price
discrimination and market power, as well as other CWB practices.  Studies focusing on barley
have also examined the likely effects on exports to the United States from removal of the CWB
monopoly.  The third section of this paper discusses the findings from these studies.  In the fourth
section, a partial equilibrium model is used to estimate the impact of transportation costs on
Canadian spring wheat exports to the United States.  The pricing behavior of the CWB is
examined in the fifth section.  The competitive structure of the Canadian wheat exports in the
world market is analyzed by observing pricing-to-market (PTM) behavior.  The final section
presents the conclusions from this study.1Much of the information about the Canadian Wheat Board’s operation and history was obtained from the
Canadian Wheat Board’s website: http://www.cwb.ca , accessed August 2004.
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OPERATION OF THE CANADIAN WHEAT BOARD
1
The Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) is a single-desk state trading agency responsible for the
marketing of all western Canadian wheat and barley sold for human domestic consumption and
export.  It is one of the largest and longest-standing public export-marketing agencies in the world
(Schmitz and Furtan 2000, p. 3), and it describes itself as the single largest seller of wheat and
barley in the world.  Its mission is to market and provide quality products and services to
maximize value to western Canadian grain farmers.  Among its goals is to extract the highest
possible returns for farmers by effectively leveraging the powers of the single desk.  The CWB
uses a price pooling system to return its net sales revenue to farmers.  A market pool is an
arrangement by which producers market their crops collectively.  The CWB is a mandatory pool,
as producers are required to sell their grain to the CWB.
The CWB was established by the Canadian Wheat Board Act of 1935.  This occurred after
government involvement in grain marketing after World War I and during the Great Depression. 
The first CWB was created after World War I to market the 1919 wheat crop.  This was meant to
be a temporary agency that would not be needed during peacetime, and it was abandoned after
one year.  This system gained support among farmers, however, which led to farmer-created
wheat pools in the three prairie provinces.  During the Great Depression, the wheat pools were
facing bankruptcy because of low wheat prices.  The federal government stepped in and provided
support by guaranteeing loans made to the wheat pools and by guaranteeing the initial payments
these pools made to the farmers.  The government hoped its involvement would be temporary, but
when it became apparent that long-term involvement was necessary, the CWB was created. 
Three pillars provide the basis of CWB operations: single-desk selling, price pooling, and
government guarantees.  As a single-desk seller, western Canadian wheat and barley producers
sell as one.  The CWB claims that a single-desk seller can command a higher return for its grains
than would multiple sellers competing against each other.  The CWB uses a price pool to ensure
that all farmers delivering the same grade of wheat or barley receive the same return at the end of
the crop year regardless of when their grain was sold.  There are four different pool accounts:
wheat, durum wheat, feed barley, and designated barley.  The price pool reduces the price risk
that producers would otherwise face in marketing their grain.  
The CWB also benefits from government guarantees of initial payments and borrowing. 
Canadian producers get an initial payment when they deliver their grain, and the Canadian
government guarantees this payment.  The initial payment is meant to represent only a portion of
the total expected value of the grain; the CWB claims it is equal to about 75 percent of their best
estimate of the average market price for the year.  Occasionally, the initial payment will be
increased during the course of the year, and adjustment payments will be made to those that had
sold grain to the CWB prior to the initial payment increase.  An interim payment is made at the
end of the crop year as an advance on the final payment.  The final payment is the amount
remaining that is due to farmers after all the marketing costs have been deducted.  If the CWB
actually has a deficit, farmers will be assured of receiving their initial payments since the
government guarantees those funds.  The federal government uses taxpayer money to cover the
CWB’s losses if it fails to capture the initial prices.  In most years, the CWB will have a surplus3
before making the final payment, but it will occasionally be in deficit.  The CWB had a deficit in
the wheat pool of C$85.4 million in 2002/03.  The barley pool was in deficit for three years in the
late 1980s and early 1990s (Dixit and Josling 1997).  The federal government also provides
guarantees on the CWB’s borrowing, which leads to low interest rates.
The CWB has the role of administering access to western Canada’s limited grain transportation
and handling resources through quotas and contracts with farmers.  Grain sales must be
coordinated with internal logistics (i.e., railcar allocation) and farmer deliveries to elevators. 
These functions, which are market-driven in the United States, are accomplished through non-
market (administrative) mechanisms in Canada.  The CWB sells grain directly to buyers (whether
they are private or government entities) and also makes use of accredited exporters, companies
that sell wheat on behalf of the CWB.
The Canadian Wheat Board Act provides the legal basis for CWB operation.  Farmers are
required by law to market through the CWB.  This has been a somewhat contentious issue in
Canada, with some farmers and commodity organizations arguing for elimination of the CWB’s
single-desk authority.  In response to public pressures for a more responsive and flexible CWB, a
few reforms were instituted in 1998.  Among these are the adoption of a board of directors
(replacing appointed commissioners), which consist primarily of elected producers, and changes
that will facilitate new types of marketing alternatives for producers.  Ten of the fifteen directors
are now elected by farmers, and five of them, including the president and CEO, are appointed by
the federal government.
The CWB may be capable of price discrimination by selling grain at higher prices in markets that
are less price sensitive and at lower prices in markets that are more price sensitive.  By pricing to
market, the CWB may be able to maximize returns to producers.  Some economists argue that the
CWB obtains price premiums in certain markets where multiple sellers would not (Kraft, Furtan,
and Tyrchniewicz 1996), although others argue that significant costs associated with the CWB are
to the disadvantage of Canadian producers (Carter and Loyns 1996).  While the CWB may be
capable of price discrimination, it is not known if the CWB’s average selling price is higher or
lower than that of U.S. exporters because of a lack of transparency.  The CWB does not reveal its
transaction prices.  If the CWB is able to extract a premium in some markets, it may be able to
sell at a discount in others, but without transaction data from the CWB, it is not known if they
undersell U.S. exporters in certain markets.  The CWB has been shown to give away protein by
over-delivering on contract specifications (Carter and Loyns 1996), so they essentially sell high
protein wheat for the price of lower protein wheat.
FINDINGS FROM PREVIOUS STUDIES
There has been much debate in both the United States and Canada regarding the behavior and the
effectiveness of the CWB.  Some in Canada argue that Canadian producers would be better off if
multiple sellers could export to the United States or overseas rather than having the CWB as a
single-desk seller, while others contend that the CWB is able to exercise market power and
extract price premiums beneficial to Canadian producers.  In the United States, some argue that
the CWB has unfair trade advantages.  While reforming the CWB and removing its monopoly
export power could make U.S. exporters more competitive, Canadian grain exports to the United4
States could increase if the single-desk seller was replaced with multiple sellers.  A number of
studies have examined these issues, and the following section discusses the findings from many
of these studies. 
Canadian Exports to the United States under a Multiple-Seller Environment
Most of the studies that have analyzed a change from the CWB’s single-desk status to multiple
sellers agree that Canadian grain exports to the United States would likely increase under a
multiple-seller environment.  Many of these studies have focused on barley.  Canadian policy
reform in August 1993 removed the single-desk selling structure of the CWB on sales to domestic
maltsters and to all U.S. consumers for feed and malting barley, creating a continental barley
market.  This policy was repealed after just six weeks because it was found to violate various
Canadian internal laws (Schmitz and Gray 2000).  This brief experiment with a continental barley
market led to a number of studies examining the economics of multiple sellers as replacements for
the CWB’s monopoly power.  
Dong and Stiegert (2003) quantified the welfare, price, and volume impacts of a change from the
CWB single-desk system to a multiple-seller structure with regard to barley.  They found that
U.S. import volume would be higher no matter the degree of the multiple sellers’ market power,
and that U.S. import price and the price to U.S. barley producers would decrease.  With regards to
welfare changes, Dong and Stiegert found that Canadian and U.S. producers would be worse off
while consumers in both countries would benefit.
The effects of various government policies, including CWB control over barley sales, on Canada -
U.S. barley trade flows were examined by Johnson and Wilson (1995) using a spatial equilibrium
model.  They found that since U.S. markets are more price elastic than Canada’s offshore
alternatives, the CWB’s optimal selling strategy would be to expand exports to the United States
beyond the level that would be consistent with a liberalized marketing system in Canada.  These
findings contradict Dong and Stiegert and others by concluding that if the CWB pursues its
optimal selling strategy, U.S. producers would be worse off with the CWB’s control of barley
sales than if a liberalized marketing system existed in Canada.  
The CWB may not be pursuing its optimal selling strategy to the United States, however.  Some
argue that the CWB voluntarily restrains exports to the United States, and such restraints would
not exist under a multiple-seller environment.  Young (1999) suggested that despite increased
economic incentives to export grain to the United States, increased exports to the United States
may not occur due to the CWB’s control of exports and concerns over the political consequences
of large flows of grain to the United States.
Johnson (1999) later concluded that a multiple-seller scenario would likely work to the
disadvantage of U.S. barley producers.  He found that larger amounts of malting barley would be
exported to the United States and malting barley price would decline.  Johnson suggested that the
CWB withholds malting barley from the U.S. market, raising the price above what it would be
under a multiple-seller environment.  Carter (1993) also suggested that the CWB appears to have
used restraint when selling barley to the United States.  Johnson’s conclusion is different for feed
barley, though, as he found that single-desk selling tends to lower the U.S. feed barley price. 
Schmitz and Gray (2000) obtained the same results, finding that feed barley exports to the United5
States could decrease while malting barley exports to the United States could increase, and feed
barley price could increase and malting barley price could decrease under multiple sellers.
Gray, Ulrich, and Schmitz (1993) also found that the volume of malting barley exports to the
United States would increase under a continental barley marketing system, while feed barley
would not be dramatically affected, and Veeman (1993) commented that barley exports to the
United States would likely increase if a number of Canadian traders were allowed to seek market
opportunities across the border.
These studies refer mostly to barley, but results for wheat would likely be similar.  Results from
these studies suggest that the CWB has restrained grain exports to the United States, and U.S.
imports could increase and prices could decline if multiple sellers were allowed to seek market
opportunities in the United States.  
Another commodity that was once under the control of the CWB is oats.  The CWB lost its
marketing authority for oats in 1989, and U.S. imports of oats from Canada have steadily
increased since that time (Johnson 1998; Carter and Loyns 1998).  While many think that imports
from Canada could increase under a multiple-seller environment, some argue that the CWB exerts
market power in overseas markets and uses unfair advantages that are detrimental to U.S. exports.
Evidence of the Canadian Wheat Board’s Price Discrimination and Market Power
Studies have examined the ability of the CWB to price discriminate in export markets for both
wheat and barley.  Lavoie (2002) found that the CWB charges different prices to different
countries for wheat of the same grade and protein content.  Lavoie obtained confidential data
from the CWB consisting of monthly average price and total quantity sold of Canadian Western
Red Spring (CWRS) wheat of grade 1 and 2, as recorded in CWB contracts from 1982 to 1994. 
CWB prices to Japan were higher than those to the rest of the world for wheat of the same grade
and protein level.  This study estimated the factors causing the price differences, taking into
consideration transportation costs, grade, protein level, loaf volume, U.S. Export Enhancement
Program (EEP) payments, and import duties.  Results indicated that the price differences are not
completely explained by elements of perfect competition, such as difference in grade or protein
content, a difference in handling and shipping cost, or a difference in scarcity rent.  Lavoie stated,
though, that the results do not provide conclusive evidence regarding the ability of the CWB to
obtain a price premium over comparable quality of U.S. wheat that is due to its market power. 
She commented that the CWB may be able to charge different prices in different markets because
Canadian wheat is recognized to be of higher quality than U.S. wheat and different markets may
have varying levels of willingness to pay for a higher quality.
Brooks and Schmitz (1999) found evidence of the ability of the CWB to price discriminate among
feed barley export markets.  They also found that the magnitude and significance of price
discrimination increased during the operation of the U.S. EEP program from 1985/86 to 1994/95. 
Lavoie (2002) and Wilson, Johnson, and Dahl (1999) reached the same conclusion regarding the
effect of the EEP subsidy on CWB price discrimination for wheat.  EEP played an important role
in the ability of the CWB to price discriminate.  It created a large price gap between the price paid
for U.S. exports to EEP recipient countries and the price paid for U.S. exports to non-recipient
countries like Japan (Brooks and Schmitz 1999).  The CWB reacted strategically to the EEP
subsidies by charging a higher price to the non-recipient countries.  6
Wilson, Johnson, and Dahl (1999) stated that price discrimination has continued since the
elimination of EEP, but at a lesser magnitude, and that it exists to the extent that STEs can exploit
market power and differentiate their product from those of competitors.  Brooks and Schmitz
remarked that the CWB was also able to price discriminate prior to EEP, but the magnitude was
smaller, and Schmitz and Furtan (2000, p. 73) also claimed that single-desk sellers can price
discriminate even without EEP.
Schmitz and Gray (2000) obtained detailed contract data, under a strict confidentiality agreement,
on daily CWB sales of barley by destination from 1985/86 through 1994/95.  They also concluded
that these data show there is price discrimination.  Gray, Ulrich, and Schmitz (1993) also found
that the CWB was able to obtain a substantial price premium for malting barley sales.  Among the
reasons for these price premiums, Gray, Ulrich, and Schmitz stated that as a single seller, the
CWB is able to offer large quantities of barley with a guaranteed quality throughout the year, and
malting houses are willing to pay a premium for such a service.  
Schmitz and Gray (2000) argued that the CWB is able to capture higher prices and additional
revenue beyond the amount that would have been generated by competitive multiple sellers of
barley through international price discrimination and market power.  Carter (1993) argued,
however, that price premiums may be due to some quality factor rather than the existence of
market power, and such premiums would also be available to private sellers.  Carter said that the
ability of the CWB to use market power to adjust export prices according to different destinations
is debatable since it has a very small share in world feed grains trade and since most CWB
exports are handled through the private trade.  Brooks (1993) disputed this last point and contends
that the CWB can price to market.  Using unit value export data from Statistics Canada from 1976
to 1988, data which Brooks claimed are inappropriate, Carter (1993) found no statistical evidence
of pricing to market for CWB barley, and he argued that there is no economic evidence that the
CWB has significant market power in the world barley market.  Clark (1995) confirmed the
results of Carter, finding that the CWB single-desk selling has no effect on prices received by
Canadian farmers for feedgrains.  Dong, Marsh, and Stiegert (2003) concluded that STEs do not
have market leadership in the differentiated global malting barley market.
The CWB may not be able to exercise much market power in the barley markets since barley
competes with a number of different grains in the feed market such as corn and sorghum, and
Canada accounts for just 5 percent of the total world trade in course grains (Carter and Loyns
1998).  The CWB has a larger share of the wheat market, though, which may allow it to exercise
some market power.  Canada accounts for about 15-20 percent of the world trade in wheat.  The
CWB is the largest seller of wheat in the world, and there are not many close substitutes for wheat
(Carter and Loyns 1998).  A 1996 study by Kraft, Furtan, and Tyrchniewicz indicated that the
CWB has been able to extract a premium of about $C13/metric ton for wheat, which they attribute
to the discriminatory powers of a single seller, taking advantage of markets in countries such as
Brazil and China.  Gardner (1999) agreed that Canada is not simply a price taker in the
international wheat market.  
Carter, Loyns, and Berwald (1998), on the other hand, argued that the CWB is essentially a price
taker in the wheat market.  To support this claim, they pointed out that there is a high degree of
substitutability among wheats from various exporters and that 75-80 percent of the wheat is
imported by developing countries whose main consideration is price.  Carter and Loyns (1998)
argued that the world grain market is competitive, given the large number of exporters and7
importers and freedom of entry.  Young (1999) also noted that since a large percentage of world
markets are classified as price sensitive bulk markets for wheat, the ability to price discriminate in
the world grain markets is limited.
While many studies agree that the CWB has the ability to engage in some degree of price
discrimination, there is disagreement about the evidence of market power.  Carter and Loyns
(1998) commented that price differences are not necessarily evidence of market power, and that
market power tests are not simple.  They argued that price differences may exist between markets
for many reasons - such as the U.S. EEP subsidies, EU export restitution, quality differences, and
particular services provided - and more than an alleged price premium is required to produce
evidence of market power.  Other economists contend, however, that the CWB can manipulate the
market to the benefit of Canadian producers (Kraft, Furtan, and Tyrchniewicz 1996, Schmitz and
Gray 2000, Brooks 1993).  If the CWB does have market power, it would be able to capture
additional economic rents through an optimal pricing strategy.
Another issue of interest to Canadian producers is the potential cost of having a single-desk
selling arrangement.  Carter and Loyns (1996) concluded that the CWB causes Canadian farmers
to be worse off as a result of higher marketing costs.  If their conclusion is correct, Schmitz and
Furtan (2000, p. 106) theorized that the CWB would be imposing an implicit export tax on
Canadian wheat and barley growers that would be trade distorting because it would lead to a
reduction in Canadian producer price and output, which would be to the advantage of producers
in the United States.  
Schmitz and Furtan (2000, p. 106) used the Canadian price premiums estimated by two studies -
the Kraft, Furtan, and Tyrchniewicz (KFT) study and a 1997 study by Schmitz, Furtan, Brooks,
and Gray - and the costs to Canadian producers calculated by Carter and Loyns, and they
estimated the effects of these premiums or costs on trade.  Using the KFT results, they found that
Canadian wheat production would have increased by 1.45 million metric tons (mmt) because of
the premiums earned through price discrimination, increasing Canadian exports by 1.1 percent of
world trade.  They found that the higher costs reported by Carter and Loyns would have
decreased wheat production by 3.29 mmt, reducing Canadian exports by 2.5 percent of world
trade.  Using the results from Schmitz et al. they found that Canadian feed and malting barley
production would increase 0.12 mmt and 0.1 mmt, respectively because of the price premiums
earned by the CWB, which would result in a growth in exports equal to 2.7 percent of the world
barley trade.
Not many studies have estimated the effect of the CWB on U.S. and Canadian market shares, but
some point to changing market shares over time as evidence of the CWB’s effectiveness. 
Schmitz and Furtan (2000, p. 193) noted that the U.S. market share for wheat was over 48 percent
in 1982 and dropped to below 30 percent in the late 1990s, while Canada’s export share for wheat
has been relatively stable over time, ranging from 15 - 20 percent, and Canadian market shares for
durum and barley have increased. 
Other Issues of Concern that Affect Competitiveness
Transparency8
Lack of transparency regarding the operations of the CWB is an important issue.  Wilson,
Johnson, and Dahl (1999) examined the topic of price transparency in the context of bidding
games with asymmetric information.  Much of the world grain market is conducted using some
form of competitive bidding, and this study developed an analytical model to describe a typical
bidding game in exporter competition.  They stated that the less transparent player gains an
informational advantage, increasing its ability to win relative to more transparent players, which
results in the less transparent player under-bidding the more transparent firms.  Wilson, Johnson,
and Dahl concluded that STEs gain a competitive advantage from divulging less information. 
However, they found that the magnitude of this advantage is small, in the area of $1-2/metric ton,
and they concluded that because of the small impact, price transparency is not of great
significance to international trade.
Initial Payment Guarantee
The initial payment received by farmers upon delivery is guaranteed by the government, which
will cover any CWB losses if it fails to capture those initial prices.  Johnson (1999) commented
that the Canadian government’s initial payment guarantee is equivalent to price insurance and
represents an implicit subsidy whether or not the pool accounts wind up in deficit.  He noted that
this is an advantage over U.S. trading firms who must buy price protection by hedging in futures
markets.  The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) (1996) estimated that since the CWB was
established in 1935, the Canadian government has provided more than $1.2 billion (U.S.) to the
CWB to cover periodic wheat and barley pool deficits.  This estimate was before the 2002/03
deficit of C$85.4 million in the wheat pool.  
Pre-payment Mechanism
Stiegert and Hamilton (1998) examined the strategic impact of the CWB’s practice of initially
paying below market prices for grain and then reimbursing producers later using a lump-sum
transfer payment.  They found that this payment system represents an implicit form of an export
subsidy which gives the CWB a marginal cost advantage and serves as a credible threat to any
competitor challenging the CWB’s long-run leadership status in the international durum market. 
Stiegert and Hamilton concluded that this institutional feature is an important factor explaining
why the CWB has been able to exert and maintain its leadership status over the past 30 years.  In
examination of the world malting barley market, however, Dong, Marsh, and Stiegert (2003)
found that the CWB and the Australian Barley Board were not setting their initial payments at
optimal levels and did not shift rent from other exporting countries by utilizing a prepayment
system as a precommitment.  Their conclusion was that the rent-shifting effects of the pre-
payment mechanism were dampened in the world barley market.
Government Guarantee of Borrowing and Export Credit Sales
Goodloe (2004) examined the Canadian government’s guarantee of CWB borrowings and export
credit sales.  This is another advantage the CWB has that is not available to private commercial
exporters.  The government guarantees lead to lower borrowing costs for the CWB.  Goodloe
concluded that these government guarantees allow the CWB to generate a financial cushion, or
non-market based revenue, that it can use to enhance returns to producers, discount export prices,
or pay administrative expenses.  Goodloe could not estimate the size and use of this financial9
cushion because of the lack of CWB transparency and reporting, but the study suggested that
these factors likely have an influence on the world grain market.
Underselling
Some studies argue that the CWB has certain advantages that would allow it to undersell grain in
export markets.  Since the Canadian government guarantees the initial price paid by the CWB to
producers, the CWB could sell the grain at lower prices without any risk to the producers.  Dixit
and Josling (1997) suggested that the government underwriting of losses allows STEs to engage
in predatory pricing in an attempt to drive commercial competitors out of the market.  There is a
lack of evidence, however, to show that the CWB engages in such activities.  The initial price in
most years is set low enough so that the CWB is not in deficit at the end of the crop year.  One
exception is the 2002/03 crop year, when a large deficit in the wheat pool had to be covered by
the federal government.  
The GAO (1996) stated that STEs that have monopoly buying authority can engage in cross-
subsidization between domestic and foreign markets or between foreign markets.  This occurs
when an STE sells a commodity for a loss in one market and finances those losses through highly
profitable sales in another country.  A study by the GAO was not able to determine if such trade-
distorting activities were occurring because complete transaction-level data needed to evaluate
CWB activities were unavailable.  
However, it has been shown that the CWB tends to sell high quality wheat for the price of lower
quality wheat.  Carter and Loyns (1996) showed that the protein content of Canadian exports is
normally well above the minimum delivery specifications.  They found that both the CWB and
the Australian Wheat Board (AWB) over-deliver protein, but the United States exporters deliver
what the customer purchases.  This protein give-away could be viewed as a form of underselling.
The U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) investigated Canadian exports of hard red
spring (HRS) and durum wheat to determine if Canadian wheat was being undersold in the U.S.
market (USITC 2003).  They found that weighted-average delivered prices for Canadian number
1 and 2 HRS wheat were lower than comparable U.S.-grown HRS wheat in 28 of 40 monthly
comparisons from June 2000 to August 2002.  They also made company-specific and place-
specific comparisons which show Canadian underselling in a slim majority of months.  As a result
of the USITC investigation, an antidumping duty of 8.87 percent was imposed on Canadian HRS
wheat.  Two of the USITC commissioners dissented, however, arguing that the evidence of
underselling for HRS wheat was mixed.  The USITC could not find evidence of underselling by
Canadian durum exporters.  
Other Advantages for STEs
Dixit and Josling (1997) wrote that governments can provide other advantages to STEs that are
not available to commercial exporters, such as tax benefits, transport subsidies, preferential
foreign exchange and public utility rates, and capital expansion funds.  Another advantage for the
CWB is that, unlike U.S. grain trading firms, the CWB does not compete for grain procurement. 
The CWB’s guaranteed supply of grain facilitates long-term marketing strategies and forward
sales commitments (Johnson 1999).10
CANADIAN WHEAT BOARD EXPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES
The Canadian Wheat Board is involved in arbitrage between U.S. and offshore markets.  The
CWB exports wheat to the market with the highest price less transportation costs.  If 
P
us-tcus>P
w-tcw, then Canada will export to the U.S. market to maximize its profits.  Canada will
ship wheat to the United States as long as the difference in prices in offshore markets and the
United States is less than differences in transportation costs.  P
us will start to decrease when
imports from Canada result in additional supplies in the U.S. market.  Canadian exports to the
United States will end when P
us-tcus = P
w-tcw. 
   P
w        = price in offshore markets
   P
us   = price in U.S. markets
   tcw           = transportation cost from Canada producing regions to offshore markets
    tcus       = transportation cost from Canada producing regions to U.S. markets
The model developed for this study is a partial equilibrium model based on a quadratic
programming algorithm.  The objective of the model is to maximize consumer and producer
welfare for the production of HRS wheat in producing regions in the United States and Canada
less the transportation costs of shipping from producing to consuming regions.  The model
contains two exporting countries and three importing regions.  
Canada is divided into five producing regions and three consuming regions to capture the inter-
dependency between the transportation system and agricultural production.  The United States is
divided into three HRS wheat producing regions and two consuming regions.  Modes of
transportation used in this study are truck, rail, and barges for inland transportation and ocean
vessel for ocean transportation.  
HRS wheat moves from producing regions to domestic consuming regions by rail or truck and to
export ports by rail, truck, or barges.  HRS wheat that is moved to export ports goes to consuming
regions in importing countries through import ports.  Or, it moves directly from producing regions
in exporting countries to consuming regions in importing countries by rail or truck within a
continent, if shipping routes exist.
It is assumed that the CWB faces highly competitive markets in the United States and overseas. 
The objective of the model is to maximize consumer and producer welfare in the exporting
countries and importing regions.  This objective function is mathematically expressed as follows:11
(1)
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i = index for producing regions in the United States and Canada,
j = index for consuming regions in the United States and Canada,
            h = index for offshore import markets,
Qh = the quantity of total imports,
Q
w
h       = the quantity of imports by offshore markets,
Qi = the quantity produced in the United States and Canada,
Qj = the quantity consumed in the United States and Canada.
Qij = the quantity shipped from production regions to domestic
consuming regions
Qih = the quantity shipped from export ports to import ports
tij = transportation from producing regions to domestic consuming regions
tih = transportation from producing regions to importing consuming regions
The first term represents the area under the export demand equation representing total import
value in the importing country, and the second term represents the total cost of imported wheat to
the offshore markets.  Thus, subtracting the import costs from total import value shows social
benefits given to consumers in offshore countries.  The third term represents the area under the
domestic demand equation, and the fourth term represents the area under the domestic supply
equation.  The final two terms are the transportation costs for domestic and offshore shipments. 
The four terms in the objective function represent the total social benefits given to domestic
producers and consumers in the United States and Canada.
This objective function is optimized subject to the following constraints:
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The first constraint indicates that demand in each offshore market equals the sum of quantities
shipped from all producing regions to the offshore markets.  The second constraint requires that
the quantity demanded in each consuming region in the United States and Canada equals the sum
of quantities from all producing regions to domestic markets.  The third constraint shows that
total quantity produced in each producing region equals the quantity shipped to all offshore
markets or domestic markets in the United States and Canada.  The next two constraints indicate
the necessary conditions for shipments from producing regions to consuming regions.  The
constraint shows that offshore wheat price less producer wheat price must be less than or equal to
the transportation cost to offshore markets.  Domestic wheat price less producer wheat price must
be less than or equal to transportation cost to domestic consuming regions.
U.S. and Canadian production data were obtained from the PS&D database from the ERS-USDA
website.  Wheat exports and imports were obtained from the FAS-USDA website.  Ocean
shipping rates were obtained from International Grain Council and U.S. domestic rail rates were
obtained from the Public Waybill data (Surface Transportation Board).  The Canadian rail rates
were obtained from Canadian National Railway website.
A baseline model was run to establish the level of Canadian exports to the United States and
estimate the price difference between the United States and Canada.  Table 1 shows the results as
transportation costs to the United States are lowered.  The CWB, as a single-desk selling agency
in Canada, strives to maximize the net return for Canadian producers.  The CWB is involved in
arbitrage between markets in the United States and offshore.  Wheat will be sold where the selling
price less transportation is greatest.  In the base model, current transportation costs to the United
States will yield 1004.2 thousand metric tons of Canadian wheat into the United States.  This
level of exports is close to the actual level of Canadian wheat exports to the United States over
the last two years.
The transportation costs from Canada to the United States are reduced to $19.17, $18.17, $18.15,
and $18.14 in scenarios 1 through 4, respectively.  These transportation costs were chosen to
determine the breaking point where exports to the United States would change significantly.  In
the first three scenarios, the level of Canadian wheat exports to the United States does not change
significantly.  Scenario 4, however, shows that if transportation costs to the United States are
lowered by $3.03 per metric ton, or about $0.081 per bushel, 5,353.7 thousand metric tons will be
exported to the United States.  At this rate, a large amount of wheat produced in Saskatchewan
would start to be shipped to the United States.  Also, if transportation costs to offshore markets
increase by that amount, the results will be the same.  The offshore transportation cost includes
the cost of Canadian railway, port handling charges, and ocean shipping rates. 13












1,000 mt 1,000 mt $/mt $/mt  $/mt
Base 30,463.3 1,004.2 21.17 116.34 113.57
Scenario 1 30,491.3 1,061.0 19.17 115.28 114.51
Scenario 2 30,504.6 1,089.4 18.17 114.74 114.97
Scenario 3 30,505.3 1,090.0 18.15 114.73 114.98
Scenario 4 30,506.0 5,353.7 18.14 114.73 114.98
The prices received by U.S. producers decrease slightly as imports increase.  However, between
Scenario 3 and Scenario 4, prices do not change with the large increase in imports.  Wheat from
Saskatchewan that is exported to Southeast Asia in Scenario 3 is exported to Minneapolis in
Scenario 4, but wheat which was shipped from North Dakota to Minneapolis in Scenario 3 is now
shipped to Southeast Asia in Scenario 4.  Supplies in the United States, therefore, do not change,
and the effect on prices is minimal.
Production in Canada does not change substantially under the various scenarios because exports
shift from offshore markets to the United States and there is no increase in export demand.  U.S.
production does not change substantially, and an increase in U.S. imports is countered by an
increase in U.S. exports.  The additional imports of wheat from Canada reduces the price of U.S.
wheat by $1.61 per metric ton, or about 4 cents per bushel.
When additional wheat is imported by the United States, the U.S. domestic price falls, reducing
the price differential between the two countries.  Wheat is being exported into the United States
only because the net return to Canadian producers is higher than that obtained from shipping to
offshore markets.  Any change in transportation costs, either offshore or domestic, or a change in
the relationship between world and U.S. domestic wheat price will affect the level of Canadian
exports to the United States.  The CWB is probably providing a leveling effect on the quantity of
Canadian exports.  In some years, the U.S. market may provide better returns than offshore
markets, and in other years it may not, but until the recent import duty, the level of Canadian
exports to the United States had been relatively constant.
The transportation costs used in the model are average costs for each producing region.  For
example, the shipping costs from Manitoba and Saskatchewan to Minneapolis are $19.30 and
$21.17 per metric ton, respectively.  The shipping cost from North Dakota to Minneapolis is
$18.40 per metric ton.  These costs represent the costs of transportation from central points in the
producing region to the destination point.  The transportation costs to the United States for
producing regions in Canada near the international border may be much less.  Transportation
costs to the United States for Canadian producers near the border could be similar to
transportation costs from North Dakota to Minneapolis or lower than the transportation cost for
producers in western North Dakota.  14
The Canadian producer could ship their wheat directly to elevators in the United States if the
CWB was eliminated.  Currently, all producers in Canada must sell their grain to the CWB, so
they do not have any choice where their grain is shipped.  Without the CWB, most Canadian
producers along the border could maximize their profit by shipping their grain to elevators in
North Dakota, Montana, and Minnesota.  As a result, the elimination of the CWB’s single-desk
selling authority may increase Canadian exports to the United States.  It would be very difficult to
limit Canadian exports under the free trade agreement.
PRICING BEHAVIOR OF THE CANADIAN WHEAT BOARD IN MAJOR MARKETS
As our study and others have shown, the CWB likely has an effect on the level of exports to the
United States.  The CWB could also could have an effect on U.S. competitiveness in offshore
markets where U.S. exporters compete with the CWB.  The market shares of U.S. wheat in the
world market have decreased since the early 1980s.  Studies related to wheat trade suggest that
decreased U.S. market shares are associated with increased sales by the competing suppliers, such
as Australia and Canada (c.f., Jin, Cho, and Koo).  Australia and Canada allow their state trading
agencies, the Australian Wheat Board (AWB) and the CWB, to act as single-desk delegates for
pooling and exporting wheat at the best possible prices.  The AWB is Australia’s major national
grain-marketing organization and is responsible for the management and marketing of all
Australian exported bulk wheat.  Together with U.S. dollar appreciation, the state trading agency
has been an important issue for U.S. wheat trade in the world market.  In particular, Canada is the
most important competitor in both the U.S. domestic market and the world market.
There is no single direct matrix to show whether an exporting country has competitive power in
the world market.  However, one can analyze competitiveness of an exporting country indirectly
by observing PTM behavior.  The PTM approach is in the framework of modeling imperfect
competition and focuses on the behavior of an exporting country in the world market.  The model
consists of an exporter and multiple importers.  In particular, we use the Knetter (1989) model to
test whether the exporting country can differentiate export prices according to each destination
market. 
Methodology
Exporters may exercise market power by adjusting prices to different export destinations.  This
PTM behavior pertains to decisions by exporters to maintain or even increase export prices when
facing currency depreciation relative to the importer’s currency.  Krugman (1987) named PTM
behavior after the phenomenon that exchange rate difference induces price discrimination in
international markets.  PTM generally involves multiple markets and is connected to the notion of
markup-pricing over marginal cost and thus imperfect competition.  Knetter (1989, 1993)
suggested a method to measure the potential markup by exporters in specific destination markets
using a firm’s PTM behavior in response to exchange rate movements.  
Drawing upon his idea, after separating time-varying marginal cost of an exporting firm, one can
easily estimate destination-specific markup of the firm.  His method is intuitively plausible and
easy to apply to empirical works, so the model has become popular for estimating potential
markup and imperfect competition in international trade.  In agricultural economics, Pick and15
Park (1991, 1996) and Pick and Carter (1994) used Knetter’s model to investigate PTM behavior
by the U.S. agricultural commodity exporters. 
In order to test for alternative market structure, Knetter (1989) proposed the following cross-
sectional time-series equation:
ln pit = θt + λi + βi ln sit + uit, (7)
where pit is the export price, θt is the time effect, λi is the country effect, sit is the exchange rate,
and uit is the error term.  Equation 7 can be used to distinguish between the following three
models of market structure.  
The first model pertains to the competitive market structure, in which export prices will be the
same for all destinations because there is no country effect, λ = 0.  Changes in the bilateral
exchange rates will not affect bilateral export prices, implying β = 0.  The time effects represented
by θt measure the common price for all destinations.
The second model assumes constant elasticity of demand with respect to the domestic currency
price in each of the importing countries, a reasonable approximation for slight movements along
the demand curve.  In such a model, the markup over marginal cost as given is constant but may
vary over time and across destinations, implying λ ≠ 0.  Shifts in bilateral exchange rates do not
influence export prices to various destinations, implying β = 0.
The third model is based on price discrimination with varying elasticity of demand.  Under this
scenario, the demand elasticity may vary with changes in the exchange rate.  Consider a
depreciation of the importer currency relative to the exporter currency.  The price faced by
consumers in the importing country increases.  If the demand elasticity remains constant, then the
second case results in which exporters are faced with a constant elasticity demand schedule. 
However, if demand elasticity changes, then the optimal markup over marginal cost will change
and export price will thus depend on exchange rates.  This is PTM behavior because the optimal
markup by a price-discriminating monopolist will vary across destinations and with changes in
bilateral exchange rates.  This case implies λ ≠ 0 and β ≠ 0.
Nonzero coefficients of β are inconsistent with both competition and price discrimination with
constant elasticity of demand.  The exporter maximizes profit in the home currency, while import
demand depends on the local currency price in the importing country.  Exchange rate changes
drive a wedge between the price paid by the buyer and the price received by the seller in their
respective currencies.  At a given price in the exporter’s currency, a depreciation of the importer’s
currency raises the local currency price paid by the importer.  If demand has constant elasticity
with respect to price, the optimal markup charged by the exporter will not change as exchange
rate changes increase the price paid by the importer.  If, however, demand elasticities change with
changes in the local currency price, then export prices will depend on exchange rates.
Data
The data used in this study consist of the unit values of Canadian and U.S. wheat to each
destination market and nominal exchange rates between the two exporting countries and16
importing countries.  The importing countries are 19 major grain importing countries - Algeria,
Belgium-Luxembourg, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Ghana, Indonesia, Italy, Japan,
Malaysia, Morocco, Mozambique, Pakistan, Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, the United
Kingdom, and Venezuela.
The Canadian unit value data were obtained from the OECD bilateral trade data set, named Trade
in Commodities and the Canadian Wheat Board.  The U.S. unit value data were obtained from
Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States (FATUS) of Economic Research Services (ERS)
of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.  Exchange rate data were obtained from International
Financial Statistics by the International Monetary Fund.  Wheat prices are expressed by exporting
country dollars per metric tons and are divided into durum and non-durum wheat unmilled.
The frequency of the sample data is annual and ranges from 1988 to 2003 for the Canadian data
and from 1989 to 2003 for the U.S. data.  Monthly or quarterly data would be more desirable, but
such data for Canada could not be obtained.  Statistics Canada published monthly data for
Canadian export volumes and values of wheat by destinations, but it does not provide the most
recent five years of data, and Brooks (1993) argued that most data from Statistics Canada would
be inappropriate for such analysis because the export values are based on CWB card prices rather
than actual sales prices.  Brooks explained that the card price is the CWB’s offering price and is
set at the level obtainable from the highest-price market, but most sales are made at prices below
the card price.  Actual transaction data from the CWB are needed to obtain the most reliable
results, but such data are not available and have on a few occasions been made available to
researchers only on a strict confidentiality agreement. 
The OECD data set for Canadian unit values ends in 1997, so samples from 1989 through 2003
were obtained from the CWB.  In some cases, when splicing the data from different sources, there
is a jump or kink in the time observation before and after the splicing.  To ascertain whether this
was the case in the Canadian data, we plotted each time series of the panel data, but did not find
evidence of any jump or kink during the sample period.
Analysis of Pricing-to-Market Behaviors of U.S. and Canadian Wheat Exporters
Empirical estimation of Equation 7 was performed using a two-way panel model for each
exporting country.  The time effect and country effect in Equation 7 are treated as fixed, so time
and cross-sectional dummies are included in the panel analysis.  The results from the panel
estimation show that each equation has relatively high fitness of the model to the data set.  In
particular, the fit for Canadian data is 0.79 and that for U.S. data is 0.74, which are relatively
high.  The null hypothesis of no-fixed effect was rejected for both equations, indicating that
inclusion of country and time-specific effects as fixed is reasonable. 
Estimation results from Canadian data show that the CWB exercises PTM behavior in Belgium-
Luxemburg, Italy, Mozambique, South Korea, and the United States.  This means that the optimal
markup charged by CWB depends on the demand schedule for wheat of the importing countries. 
The CWB’s behavior following the second model was found only in China, suggesting that the
markup over marginal cost exists, but shifts in bilateral exchange rates do not influence export
prices to China.  In all other importing countries, the CWB behaves as a perfect competitor.  17
Estimation results from U.S. data show that the PTM behavior of U.S. private wheat exporters
was identified in Algeria, Columbia, Pakistan, and Venezuela.  The second model behavior by the
U.S. wheat exporters was found in Brazil, China, and the United Kingdom.  
The results from this study highlight several notable points.  First, while both the CWB and U.S.
exporters are found to price-to-market in some markets, one cannot conclude that either the CWB
or U.S. wheat exporters have more significant PTM behavior than its competitor in the major
wheat importing countries.  Second, with respect to the bilateral trade between Canada and the
United States, Canadian wheat exporters exhibit PTM behavior, but U.S. exporters have only
markup over marginal cost, and exchange rate changes do not influence export prices to Canada. 
Third, findings of PTM behaviors by the two exporting countries, albeit confined to some
importing countries, suggest that the international wheat market is imperfectly competitive.
The finding that the CWB prices-to-market in some countries is consistent with a number of
previous studies that show that the CWB can price discriminate.  These findings, though, are most
consistent with Carter (1993) and Carter, Loyns, and Berwald (1998) who argued that the CWB’s
ability to price discriminate in the world grains market is limited and its ability to exercise market
power is questionable.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS FROM ELIMINATING OR REFORMING THE 
CANADIAN WHEAT BOARD
The empirical analysis presented in the previous sections found that removal of the CWB could
increase Canadian exports of HRS and durum wheat to the United States, while U.S. exports to
offshore markets could increase.  However, due to data limitations, it is difficult to quantify the
net overall effect of removal of the CWB.  Price data from the CWB, which are unavailable, are
needed for further quantitative analysis.  We can, however, provide qualitative analysis on the
likely effects from eliminating or reforming the CWB based on our empirical findings.  This
study examines two scenarios.  In the first scenario, the single-desk authority of the CWB is
eliminated.  Canada maintains the CWB in the second scenario, but it is reformed and its hidden
subsidies are removed.
If the CWB’s single-desk authority is eliminated, the United States may become more
competitive in offshore markets as the advantages enjoyed by the CWB disappear.  There would
no longer be any hidden subsidies given to farmers through the CWB.  Notable among these
hidden subsidies is the government guarantee of initial payments.  The multiple sellers in Canada
would have to compete for grain procurement, as opposed to the single-desk CWB’s advantage of
a guaranteed grain supply, and the multiple sellers would not give away protein like the CWB. 
Furthermore, if the CWB has been effective in using market power to price discriminate, as some
studies suggest, then the elimination of the single-desk seller would influence Canadian pricing
behavior.  These changes would make U.S. exports more competitive in offshore markets.  The
result of this would likely be an increase in U.S. exports.
The increase in U.S. export competitiveness, however, may be a short-run phenomenon.  Canada
may increase its competitiveness in the long run.  Currently, Canada’s port facilities may not be
as efficient as those in the United States because of a lack of competition.  The CWB is the only18
supplier of grain, and the Canadian ports do not compete for the handling of grain.  The
elimination of the CWB would likely lead to the modernization of Canadian ports to compete
with ports in the United States.  In the long run, Canada is likely to improve its transportation and
handling system to make its exports more competitive in offshore markets.  Some studies have
argued that there are costs to the Canadian producers that are due to the CWB.  Removal of the
CWB could result, in the long run, in reduced marketing costs for Canadian producers, increased
buying competition, and a better price discovery mechanism. 
In general, production costs in Canada are lower than those in the United States.  This is largely
due to lower land costs and lower chemical costs.  If CWB subsidies have benefitted Canadian
producers, removal of these subsidies would likely lead to lower land values and lower land costs
in Canada, which would have a positive effect on Canadian competitiveness.
It is also possible that the United States may not enjoy all of the initial benefits from the removal
of the CWB, as there would be increased competition from Australia and other countries. 
Because of newer mixing technologies, there is a higher degree of substitution of HRS wheat with
other types of wheat from Australia and other countries.  Therefore, if Canadian competitiveness
decreases, the United States must compete with Australia, Argentina, and others to capture
Canada’s lost market share.
U.S. competitiveness abroad is one issue to consider, the other issue is the level of Canadian
exports to the United States.  There would likely be negative domestic effects as imports from
Canada could increase.  Without the CWB, there would be no control on Canadian exports to the
United States, and small elevators and multinational companies could export to the United States
to take advantage of market opportunities.  The level of U.S. imports from Canada would depend
on the freight rates.  It is likely that U.S. imports from Canada would increase without the CWB,
but this could be moderated if Canadian railroads adjust their rates to the west and east ports for
exports.
The U.S. and Canadian markets would become more integrated without the CWB.  It would be
possible for multinational grain companies to buy wheat in Canada and export it from U.S. ports. 
In an integrated market, it is likely that an increase in U.S. wheat supply will be from Canada. 
U.S. wheat production is not likely to increase since it is facing pressure from corn and soybean
production, which benefit from ethanol and biodiesel programs.  Because of the lower wheat
production costs in Canada and the pressure in the United States from corn and soybeans, U.S.
wheat supply from Canada could increase.
The net benefit from eliminating the CWB’s single-desk authority for the U.S. wheat industry
could be significant in the short run but reduced significantly in the long run.  U.S. wheat
producers could benefit from increased competitiveness abroad as CWB advantages and hidden
subsidies are removed, leading to an increase in U.S. exports.  But U.S. producers could also be
harmed from increased wheat imports from Canada as multiple sellers look to take advantage of
market opportunities across the border.  The benefits for U.S. exporters could be short-lived as
the Canadian industry improves its competitiveness and competition between the United States
and other exporting countries increases.  Domestically it is likely that the U.S. and Canadian
markets will become more integrated. 19
The other scenario is for Canada to maintain the CWB, but for the CWB to reform its practices
and remove hidden subsidies.  Eliminating subsidies such as the initial payment guarantee and
making the CWB transparent could increase U.S. competitiveness in offshore markets.  As in the
previous scenario, the benefits may decrease in the long run because of competition from
substitutes in other countries and a possible decrease in Canadian land values resulting from the
elimination of the Canadian subsidies.
Since freight rates from Canada to offshore markets are higher than those to the United States, the
CWB could try to export more to the United States to take advantage of lower freight rates under
this scenario.  However, these exports may be limited, mainly because U.S. producers could be
more competitive than Canadian producers in shipping wheat to U.S. mills due to lower shipping
costs from U.S. producers to the mills within the country.  On the other hand, the CWB may have
an advantage because Canadian wheat is cleaner than similarly classified U.S. wheat and contains
more protein.
The net benefit from maintaining the CWB’s single-desk authority but eliminating trade-
distorting practices may be greater than the benefit from completely eliminating the CWB.  In
both scenarios, the United States would likely become more competitive in offshore markets, and
Canadian exports to the United States may increase.  Canada would likely improve its
competitiveness in the long run by making improvements in the transportation and handling
system, but these improvements may not be as likely as long as the CWB maintains single-desk
authority.  Further, the increase in Canadian exports to the United States could be more limited as
long as the CWB is the single-desk seller.  Overall, however, the United States could benefit the
most from complete elimination of STEs because U.S. exporters also compete with other STEs
such as the Australian Wheat Board, and these STEs have many elements distorting free trade.  If
it is not possible to eliminate them, the next best alternative would be to make them more
transparent and eliminate their trade-distorting practices. 
CONCLUSIONS
The practices of the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) are an important issue in U.S. - Canada trade
disputes and WTO negotiations.  Competing views suggest that removal of the CWB’s single-
desk authority could either have positive or negative effects on U.S. grain producers.  This study
analyzes the CWB’s effect on U.S. producers by reviewing findings from previous research and
developing models to analyze Canadian wheat exports to the United States and the competitive
structure of Canadian wheat exports in the world market.  
Elimination of the CWB could result in an increase in Canadian wheat exports to the United
States because individual producers in Canada could export grain to the United States to obtain
higher prices.  Wheat is being exported into the United States only because the net return to
Canadian producers is higher than that obtained from shipping to offshore markets.  Any change
in transportation costs, either offshore or domestic, or a change in the relationship between world
and U.S. domestic wheat price will affect the level of Canadian exports to the United States.  The
CWB is probably providing a leveling effect on the quantity of Canadian exports.  In some years
the U.S. market may provide better returns than offshore markets, and in other years it may not;20
however, until the recent import duty, the level of Canadian exports to the United States had been
relatively constant.
Transportation costs to the United States for Canadian producers near the border are lower than
those for the average Canadian producer.  Without the CWB, most Canadian producers along the
border could maximize their profit by shipping their grain to elevators in North Dakota, Montana,
and Minnesota.  As a result, the elimination of the CWB may result in an increase in Canadian
exports to the United States. 
The CWB is found to exercise PTM behavior in certain markets.  However, this finding is not
conclusive because of data limitations for Canadian wheat export prices in each export
destination.  Higher frequency data for Canadian exports and prices or the actual transaction data
from the CWB would provide more meaningful results.  These data, however, were unavailable. 
Previous studies have shown that the CWB price discriminates in export markets, but there is
disagreement between economists regarding the degree of market power the CWB has and the
ability the CWB has to set prices and influence market shares.  
The net benefit from eliminating the CWB’s single-desk authority for the U.S. wheat industry
could be significant in the short run but reduced significantly in the long run.  U.S. wheat
producers could benefit from increased competitiveness abroad as CWB advantages and hidden
subsidies are removed, leading to an increase in U.S. exports.  But U.S. producers could also be
harmed from increased wheat imports from Canada as multiple sellers look to take advantage of
market opportunities across the border.  The benefits for U.S. exporters could be short-lived as
the Canadian industry improves its competitiveness and competition between the United States
and other exporting countries increases.  Domestically, it is likely that the U.S. and Canadian
markets will become more integrated. 
If the CWB reforms its practices and removes hidden subsidies, the net benefits for the U.S.
wheat industry could be greater than those from eliminating the CWB.  Exporting STEs, in
principle, are against the policy of free trade.  STEs have many elements which may distort trade
flows.  In addition, the United States competes with other STEs in addition to the CWB.  Thus,
the U.S. wheat industry would benefit most from complete elimination of STEs.  If it is not
possible to eliminate them, the next best alternative would be to eliminate their trade-distorting
practices.  Among these reforms, subsidies received by STEs should be eliminated, including the
government guarantee of initial payments and the underwriting of losses, and STEs should be
made more transparent in terms of operations. 21
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